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1961] RECENT CASES 129
revive the prior will a new will or codicil must be executed1o This view is
sustained by reason and weight of authority, although disapproved by a minor-
ity of the courts.'1 North Dakota follows the English rule through statute.
12
In conclusion it is interesting to note that where not governed by statute
each view claims to have the weight of authority. It seems that the revival
and anti-revival theories are too rigid and may easily destroy the intent of the
testator, however the intent theory has remedied this situation and consequent-
ly would result in a more just decision.
VINCENT SONJU.
WILLS - TESTAM11ENTARY CAPACITY - INSANE DELUSION. - After forty years
of happy married life decedent became obsessed with the idea that his wife
was unfaithful. In fact he had some basis for such thinking although it was
illogical, unreasonable, and unjust. The testator was rational and apparently
of sound mind in all other respects. The court said that one who believes in
suppositions which have no existence except in his imagination is suffering
from a morbid delustion so far as these beliefs are concerned. And though he
conducts himself logically upon the assumption of the delusion, on that par-
ticular subject it is an insane delusion. The New York Court of Appeals held,
three justices dissenting, that the question of testamentary capacity was for
the jury. In-re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676 (Ct. App.
1960).
An insane delusion which affects the provisions of a will is held to be
sufficient to devoid a will for la.k of testamentary capacity.' Since the testa-
tor's mental capacity is assumed' the burden of coming forward with the
evidence to prove the lack of testamentary capacity is upon the contestants.3
However, a delusion to be declared an insane delusion4 must be an irremovable
belief that is not true or does not exist, based on no evidence whatever; con-
sequently causing the testator to dispose of his property in a manner different
from what he would have followed in the absence of such a belief.5
Testator's delusions of wife's unfaithfulness, children's illegitimacy, feelings
of having life threatened, or other feelings, however eccentric or absurd, do
net invalidate a will if there is some basis for such thoughts.6
10. Driver v. Sheffield, 211 Ga. 316, 85 S.E.2d 766 (1955); Singleton v. Singleton,
269 Ky. 330, 107 S.W.2d 273 (1937); In re Walsh's Will, 5 Misc.2d 801, 161 N.Y.S.2d
227 (Sur. Ct. 1957). In re Eberhardt's Estate, 1 Wis.24 439, 85 N.W.2d 483 (1957).
11. See Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N.W. 901, 904 (1911).
12. N.D. Rev. Code § 56-0408 (1943).
1. In re Leonard's Estate, 92 Cal.App. 420, 207 P.2d 66 (1949); Sterling v. Dubin,
6 ll.2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955); Thayer v. Thayer, 188 Mich. 261, 154 N.W. 32
(1915).
2. Houston v. Grigsby, 217 Ala. 506, 116 So. 68 (1928); Roller v. Kurtz, 6 ll.2d
618, 129 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Black v. Smith, 58 N.D. 109, 224 N.W. 915 (1929).
3. In re Johnson's Will, 201 Iowa 687, 207 N.V. 748 (1926); Black v. Smith, 58
N.D. 109, 224 N.W. 915 (1929); Hedderisch v. Hcdderisch, 18 N.D. 488, 123 N.W.
276 (1909).
4. Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, "Not every d~lusion is an insane delusion. If the
belief is supported by any facts, however little their evidential force, then it is not an
insane delusion although it may appear illogical and foundationless." Bohler v. Hicks,
120 Ca. 800, 48 S.E. 306 (1904), "The delusion must spring up spontaneously in the
mind of the person, and not be the result of evidence ef any kind."
5. John v. Tallett, 341, Ill.App. 240, 93 N.E.2d 82 (1950); Jackman v. North, 398
Ill. 95, 75 N.E.2d 324 (1947); Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239, 25 Pac. 769 (1891).
6. In re Alegria's Estate, 87 Cal.App.2d 645, 197 P.2d 571 (1948); In re Hayer's
Estate, 230 Iowa 880, 299 N.W. 431 (1941); In re Cole, 5 N.W. 348 (Wis. 1880).
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A mistake in judgment or an erroneous conclusion is not an insane delusion.7
Even though it be a conclusion which the average person would not draw,
if truly a conclusion it is attributable only to a dull, hasty, willful or ec-
centric judgment, and not to an insane delusion.8 Only when the belief be-
comes such a mania that it destroys the testator's power to reason will the
testator lose the testamentary capacity.0 This is true even if there is basis for
the testator's belief.
The testator's insane delusion must affect the will at the time of its exe-
cution as to the extent of his estate, the nature of the provisions or the ob-
jects of his bounty.10 The mere prejudice or dislike that a testator has for
natural objects of his bounty is not grounds for invalidating a will." Deeply
engrained in our capitalistic and individualistic philosophy is the premise that
one may do what he wishes with his own.12
THOMAS WOLD.
7. In re Struve's Estate, 100 Cal.App. 255, 279 Pac. 846 (1929);Bohler v. Hicks, 120
Ga. 800, 48 S.E. 306 (1904); Jorn v. Tallett, 341 Il1. 240, 93 N.E.2d 82 (1950).
8. Jones v. Nat'l. Bank of Commerce in Memphis, 220 Ark. 665, 249 S.W.2d 105,
(1952); Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405 (1908); In re Stepenson's
Estate, 132 Ore. 234, 285 Pac. 224 (1930).
9. See Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 109 N.E. 193 (1915); O'dell v. Goff, 149
Mich. 152, 112 N.W. 736 (1907); Ingersoll v. Gourley, 78 Wash. 406, 139 Pac. 207
(1914). These cases refer to religious or spiritual beliefs which have destroyed the reason-
ing power.
10. In ro Selb's Estate, 84 Cal.App. 46, 190 P.2d 277 (1948); In re Hayer's Estate,
230 Itiwa 880, 299 N.W.,431 (1941); Roller v. Kurtz, 6 Ill.2d 618, 129 N.E2d 693
(1955).
11. Jackman v. Noth, 398 Ill. 95, 75 N.E.2d 324 (1947); Drum v. Capps, 240 Ill.
524, 88 N.E. 1020 (1909); Heddeich v. Hedderich, 18 N.D. 488, 123 N.W. 276 (1909).
12. See Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239, 25 Pac. 769 (1891), "While it seems harsh and
cruel to disinherit one's children and devise to strangers for some unworthy motive, yet so
long as that motive, whether from pride, averision, spite, or prejudice, is not resolvable
into mental perversion, no court can interfere."
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